1. Introduction {#sec1}
===============

In the recent past, technology has become an integral part of our lives. The internet-based communications involve transmitting digital information in terms of images, videos, financial transactions by digital signatures, a classified military database map, the blueprint of a city, and many more. The obvious question that arises is that are these digital transmissions secure? The answer that caters to this question falls under the realm of information security. It emphasizes the importance of the integrity of data as a significant source of concern for individuals and firms, which in turn makes data encryption, a prominent research area. The three basic approaches under the gamut of cryptography are encryption, steganography, and watermarking. Encryption aims at preventing any malicious party to manipulate the data, but at the same time hints at a possible communication between parties. Steganography tries to embed the data into some other text so that we have a concealed original text to inhibit any clues of communication. Watermarking deals with authentication of the data rather than its specific security. Some of the popular algorithms used in cryptography for these purposes are the Improves Proposed Encryption Standards [@b1], renamed in 1992 to (IDEA), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [@b2], Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) [@b3]. The aforementioned cryptographic algorithms process each bit of the data by performing multiple rounds of s-box substitutions and permutations to produce the final cipher. The design of these algorithms exploit a block cipher based approach. The algorithms are used for multimedia data encryption is used apart from the AES-Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode which has various visual redundancies. Therefore, encryption by this traditional algorithm is quite inefficient and lackluster. The AES-ECB mode works as a block cipher and encrypts the text in blocks. The major limitation involved with this is that similar blocks of plaintexts get encrypted into similar ciphertexts. [Fig. 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"} clearly shows the security issues with the AES-ECB mode, whereas the stream cipher AES-CTR mode encrypts the image into a noise-like structure. Therefore, one may not prefer this traditional ECB mode for securing digital image communication and rather opt for CTR mode. However, we implement an alternative encryption scheme based on chaotic map that is sufficiently secure based on the comparative analysis of our scheme with the CTR mode on the information entropy of the cipher image. The results based on the entropy values of the partial cipher obtained by the AES-CTR mode and the proposed method is given in [Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"}, whereas the comparative analysis of the histogram analysis is done in [Fig. 2](#fig2){ref-type="fig"}. Inferring from the results, we would like to assume that, though the CTR mode has a slight advantage over the proposed method, but nevertheless the proposed method is a viable option in terms of cipher generation when it comes to designing an intermediate step in a steganographic algorithm.

Harnessing the intrinsic properties of digital images like inter-pixel redundancy, psycho-visual redundancy, coding redundancy, specialized algorithms were proposed for image encryption in the past. The basic idea of any image encryption algorithm is to transform a plain image into a noise-like image. In recent years, quite a few algorithms were developed for image encryption. The encryption is done in spatial as well as in the frequency domain. In the first case, the image is transformed in the existing domain, i.e., spatial domain, whereas the second involves transforming the image into a frequency domain. Some of the spatial domain-based image encryption algorithms composed of the permutation and substitution architecture can be seen in [@b4], [@b5], [@b6], [@b7], [@b8], [@b9], [@b10]. These algorithms utilize tools such as the bit-plane decomposition, the chaotic properties of dynamical systems. A new spatial domain encryption algorithm presented in [@b11] uses DNA computing and a hybrid genetic algorithm to convert the original image into the cipher image. The frequency-domain encryption methods can be found in [@b12], which encrypts the data in the Fourier domain. A novel Fractional Fourier transform method and finite field cosine transform can be seen in [@b13], [@b14]. Other wavelet-based and Fourier transform-based encryption algorithms have been introduced in [@b15], [@b16]. [@b17] presented a recent development in image security by harnessing modular chaotic maps. The end product of either approach is to generate an incoherent cipher image that conceals any information about the original image. One obvious inference that an adversary can make upon intercepting the noise-like or texture-like images is that it is a cipher and not the original one. Further, a noisy look can prompt the intruders to apply some cryptanalysis on the cipher and can gain information about the original image. As a result, some significant loopholes were observed in various existing algorithms by performing proper cryptanalysis [@b18], [@b19], [@b20].Fig. 1Ciphers generated with AES-ECB and AES-CTR mode: First row Images-(Left to Right) Sierpinsky carpet of size 256 × 256, TUX-Linux mascot of size 256 × 256, Image with text written of size 256 × 256, Hilbert Space filling curve of size 256 × 256. Second row Images -(Left to Right) Corresponding Cipher images from AES-ECB mode revealing the basic structure of the images. Third row Images-(Left to Right) Corresponding Cipher images obtained by AES-CTR mode. Fourth row Images-(Left to Right) MSB of Goldhill Image of size 512 × 512, MSB of Lena Image of size 512 × 512, MSB of Barbara Image of size 512 × 512, MSB of Man & Woman Image of size 512 × 512. Fifth row Images -(Left to Right) Corresponding Cipher images from AES-ECB mode revealing the basic structure of the images. Sixth row Images-(Left to Right) Corresponding Cipher images obtained by AES-CTR mode.Fig. 2Histogram analysis of ciphers: First row (left to right) AES-CTR cipher for Sierpinsky carpet of size 512 × 512, TUX-Linux mascot of size 512 × 512, Image with text written of size 512 × 512, Hilbert Space filling curve of size 512 × 512. Second row Images-(Left to Right) AES-CTR cipher for Goldhill Image of size 512 × 512, Lena Image of size 512 × 512, Barbara Image of size 512 × 512, Man & Woman Image of size 512 × 512. Third row (left to right) Proposed method (GBDA) partial cipher for Sierpinsky carpet of size 512 × 512, TUX-Linux mascot of size 512 × 512, Image with text written of size 512 × 512, Hilbert Space filling curve of size 512 × 512. Fourth row Images-(Left to Right) Proposed method (GBDA) partial cipher for Goldhill Image of size 512 × 512, Lena Image of size 512 × 512, Barbara Image of size 512 × 512, Man & Woman Image of size 512 × 512.Table 1Entropy analysis of AES-CTR mode vs Proposed method (GBDA).Entropy (in bits)ImageAES-CTRProposed (GBDA)Sierpinsky7.99937.9992Tux-Linux mascot7.99937.9993Image with text7.99937.9993Hilbert space filling curve7.99937.9992Goldhill7.99937.9992Lena7.99937.9992Barbara7.99937.9993Man& Woman7.99947.9992

A partial answer to bypass the first step of visual cryptanalysis can be in the form of steganography. Standard data hiding and steganographic algorithms include [@b21], [@b22], [@b23], whereas the SVD and wavelet-based watermarking techniques include [@b24], [@b25], [@b26]. However, steganography generally imposes restrictions on the size of the embedded data and the size of the cover medium, where the former is way smaller than the latter. This condition is to ensure that each pixel in the cover image contains at most one bit of the secret. A more generalized way of communicating secret image can be given in the form of generating visually coherent cipher images (VCCI) instead of the random noise like cipher images. The initial work done in this direction was proposed in [@b27], which generated a visually meaningful cipher image (VMCI). It exploits an existing encryption algorithm and then embedding the partial cipher into the vertical, horizontal, and diagonal subbands of the host image in discrete wavelet transform [@b28] (DWT) domain of the host image. The final coherent image is transmitted over the public channel/cloud with the minimal chance of suspicion from any adversary. The work presented in [@b29] is a refinement of the previous scheme that aims at minimizing the texture like appearance in the final cipher in addition to the lossless decryption of the original image. The work reported in [@b30] aims to encrypt only the salient regions of the image to produce the VMCI, thereby reducing the computational effort. A different approach to generate VCCI's was put forward by Chai et al. in [@b31], by combining compressive sensing to their encryption mechanism. The approach did manage to reduce the transmission cost. However, the compression involved at the time of transmission did affect the decryption quality of the original image since the reconstruction involved optimization techniques. The two critical points that need to be improved in the above schemes are as follows:

1.The final VMCI size increases by $4$ times, i.e., the encrypted version of an image $I$ of size $n \times n$ becomes $2n \times 2n$. This increment in the size of the cipher image further increases the transmission cost by requiring larger bandwidth for transmission and also adds to the storage cost over the cloud.2.In the process of designing these meaningful ciphers, the host/reference image reconstruction is not performed. Even though the steps involved in the reference image reconstruction are straightforward, the architecture is such that perfect reconstruction is not possible. The main reason for this flaw is that the detailed sub-bands obtained after the host image decomposition are discarded to embed the partial cipher, and once these pieces of information are discarded, there is no way of getting them back.

2. Related work {#sec2}
===============

As mentioned earlier, the pioneering work in this area of generating VMCI was proposed in [@b27]. In the VMCI generation method, two major phases were considered :

1.Pre-Encryption Phase: This phase involves the encryption of the original image with the permutation-substitution framework by performing pre-existing algorithms. This phase is the traditional phase used in almost all image encryption algorithms which converts all original images into similar-looking noise like images.2.Embedding Phase: The major emphasis of this work lies in this phase, as it involves generating the VMCI by implementing an embedding algorithm. The embedding is done by taking a reference image of four times the size of the original image and performing the DWT with a proper filter $K_{t}$ on it. This decomposes the image into $4$ sub-bands namely : Approximation Detail band $\left( C_{A} \right)$, Horizontal Detail band $C_{H}$, Vertical Detail band $\left( C_{V} \right)$, Diagonal Detail band $\left( C_{D} \right)$, each sub-band resulting in dimension $n \times n$. The band $C_{V},C_{D}$ are modified to embed the pre-encrypted image into them, leaving $C_{H}$ unaltered. The embedding is done by sequentially extracting the digits of each pixel of the pre-encrypted image. Mathematically, it can be written as $$C_{V}\left( i,j \right) = \left\lfloor \left( \frac{P\left( i,j \right)}{10} \right) \right\rfloor$$$$C_{D}\left( i,j \right) = P\left( i,j \right)\;\operatorname{mod}\; 10$$ this equations is $\forall\quad P\left( i,j \right) \in \left\lbrack 0,255 \right\rbrack$, $C_{V}$= Ten's and hundred's digit of $P\left( i,j \right)$, $C_{D}$=unit's digit of $P\left( i,j \right)$. Example if $P\left( i,j \right) = 243$, then $C_{V} = 24$, $C_{D} = 3$. Thus, at the time of decryption, we know that $P\left( i,j \right) = 2 \ast 10^{2} + 4 \ast 10 + 3$. After this embedding, the four parts are combined by performing the inverse-DWT on them, resulting in the final VMCI.

The work proposed in [@b29] is an extension of [@b27] in the sense that it does not override the values in the $C_{V},C_{D}$ part, but presents an expression where the bit-plane representation of the encrypted image is utilized to embed the secret image into the host image. For any $P \in \left\lbrack 0,255 \right\rbrack$, $P$ can be written in the binary format as $P = \sum_{i = 0}^{7}b_{i}2^{i}$. The algorithm extracts 2 sets of three bits each and a tuple of two bits, i.e., $b_{0}b_{1}b_{2}$, $b_{3}b_{4}b_{5}$ and $b_{6}b_{7}$ and embeds them in the least significant bits of $C_{H},C_{V},C_{D}$. The inverse-IWT is performed to combine the new bands resulting in the final VMCI of size $2n \times 2n$.

Restricting our attention to design a better version of these schemes, we present a novel encryption-data hiding algorithm that not only safeguards the original image from any adversary but also reduces the transmission and storage costs of the final VMCI.

3. Proposed encryption scheme {#sec3}
=============================

3.1. Pre-encryption phase {#sec3.1}
-------------------------

In addition to the generation of the same size VMCI, we also present an image encryption scheme, which is the intermediate step in our algorithm. This step is essential because in case the eavesdropper can decode the VMCI, it should not be able to decipher the cipher image. Our encryption algorithm reads an image $I$ of size $n \times n$ and produces the partial cipher $C$ of the same size at the end of this phase. There are two subroutines involved in this phase: permutation subroutine and diffusion subroutine. These two phases are explained in detail in this section.

### 3.1.1. Permutation subroutine: {#sec3.1.1}

This phase involves a scrambling of the pixel locations in the original image $I$, so as to de-correlate the pixels. This phase is driven by the chaotic Arnold 3-D cat map [@b32]. The 3-D map is a generalization of its 2-D counterpart $$\begin{bmatrix}
x_{j + 1} \\
y_{j + 1} \\
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & p \\
q & {1 + pq} \\
\end{bmatrix}\begin{bmatrix}
x_{j} \\
y_{j} \\
\end{bmatrix}\;\operatorname{mod}\; n$$where $n$ is the dimension of the square image, $\left( x_{j},y_{j} \right)$ and $\left( x_{j + 1},y_{j + 1} \right)$ are the original and transformed intensity respectively, $p$ and $q$ are the chaotic parameters. The map is generalized to 3-D by a series of transformations. The first transformation applies the 2-D map on the $xy$ plane, keeping the $z$ plane unchanged by the following transformations: $$\begin{bmatrix}
x_{j + 1} \\
y_{j + 1} \\
z_{j + 1} \\
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & p_{z} & 0 \\
q_{z} & {1 + p_{z}q_{z}} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 \\
\end{bmatrix}\begin{bmatrix}
x_{j} \\
y_{j} \\
z_{j} \\
\end{bmatrix}\;\operatorname{mod}\; n$$The second and third transformation applies on the $yz$ and $xz$ plane by the following transformations: $$\begin{bmatrix}
x_{j + 1} \\
y_{j + 1} \\
z_{j + 1} \\
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & p_{x} \\
0 & q_{x} & {1 + p_{x}q_{x}} \\
\end{bmatrix}\begin{bmatrix}
x_{j} \\
y_{j} \\
z_{j} \\
\end{bmatrix}\;\operatorname{mod}\; n\quad\quad\quad\text{and}\quad\quad\quad$$$$\begin{bmatrix}
x_{j + 1} \\
y_{j + 1} \\
z_{j + 1} \\
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0 & p_{y} \\
0 & 1 & 0 \\
q_{y} & 0 & {1 + p_{y}q_{y}} \\
\end{bmatrix}\begin{bmatrix}
x_{j} \\
y_{j} \\
z_{j} \\
\end{bmatrix}\;\operatorname{mod}\; n$$ To construct the 3-D map, we combine all the three transformations to get the equation in [Box I](#tbxI){ref-type="boxed-text"}.

Since, $det\left( ABC \right) = det\left( A \right)det\left( B \right)det\left( C \right)$, hence, for all parameters $p_{x},p_{y},p_{z},q_{x},q_{y},q_{z}$ the map remains unimodular. Setting $p_{a} = 1,q_{a} = 1\quad\forall\quad a,b \in \left\{ x,y,z \right\}$. Setting up these values maintains the symmetricity of each individual transformation to get $$\begin{bmatrix}
x_{j + 1} \\
y_{j + 1} \\
z_{j + 1} \\
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
2 & 1 & 3 \\
3 & 2 & 5 \\
2 & 1 & 4 \\
\end{bmatrix}\begin{bmatrix}
x_{j} \\
y_{j} \\
z_{j} \\
\end{bmatrix}\;\operatorname{mod}\; n$$The numerical computations validate the chaotic properties of this 3-D map by calculating the Lyapunov exponents of this map which come out to be $\alpha_{1} = 7.1842$, $\alpha_{2} = 0.2430,\alpha_{3} = 0.5728$. Since all three Lyapunov exponents are positive, implying the extended map is indeed chaotic. The main motivation to use this instead of the 2-D map is due to presence of the leading exponent being larger than its 2-D counterpart's exponent of $\beta_{1} = 2.618033988$. We use only one parameter $q_{x}$ as a key in our algorithm with its values ranging in the set $\left\{ 1,2,..16 \right\}$. We implement this transform with the series of steps given below :Box I$$\begin{bmatrix}
x_{j + 1} \\
y_{j + 1} \\
z_{j + 1} \\
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
{1 + p_{x}p_{z}q_{y}} & p_{z} & {p_{y} + p_{x}p_{z} + p_{x}p_{y}p_{z}q_{y}} \\
{q_{z} + p_{x}q_{y} + p_{x}p_{z}q_{y}q_{z}} & {1 + p_{z}q_{z}} & {p_{y}p_{z} + p_{x}p_{y}p_{z}q_{y}q_{z} + p_{x}p_{z}q_{z} + p_{x}p_{y}q_{y} + p_{x}} \\
{p_{x}q_{x}q_{y} + q_{y}} & q_{x} & {p_{x}p_{y}q_{x}q_{y} + p_{x}q_{x} + p_{y}q_{y} + 1} \\
\end{bmatrix}\begin{bmatrix}
x_{j} \\
y_{j} \\
z_{j} \\
\end{bmatrix}\;\operatorname{mod}\; n$$

P1:Input the grayscale image $I$. If the image is not square, then perform a padding to make it a square image. After the padding we get an image of size $n \times n$. Further, the padding should be done in such a way that $n^{2} = d^{3}$ after padding, where $d$ is some positive integer. Thus, after this pre-processing, we get an image $I$ of size $n \times n$.P2:Extract $d$ blocks of size $d \times d$ from the plane $I$. These blocks are chosen by traversing the plane $I$ from the top left pixel. Reshape these blocks obtained into a cube $B_{1}$ of size $d \times d \times d$. The original image which had the representation as $I\left( x,y \right)$ now has the representation $B_{1}\left( x,y,z \right)$. The schematic of cube generation is given in [Fig. 3](#fig3){ref-type="fig"}.P3:Any pixel $p$ in the cube $B_{1}$ has coordinates $\left( x_{p},y_{p},z_{p} \right)$. Apply the Arnold map to the coordinates using the following equation: $$\begin{bmatrix}
x_{p + 1} \\
y_{p + 1} \\
z_{p + 1} \\
\end{bmatrix} = \left( {\begin{bmatrix}
2 & 1 & 3 \\
3 & 2 & 5 \\
2 & 1 & 4 \\
\end{bmatrix}\begin{bmatrix}
x_{p} \\
y_{p} \\
z_{p} \\
\end{bmatrix}} \right)\;\operatorname{mod}\;\quad d$$Each round of the permutation is carried out by a different Arnold matrix to enhance the security aspects of the cryptosystem.P4:After the permutation we get a shuffled cube $\overset{\sim}{B_{1}}$. The phase ends with reshaping $\overset{\sim}{B_{1}}\left( x,y,z \right)$ into $\overset{\sim}{I}\left( x,y \right)$, which is done using the following equation. $$\overset{\sim}{I}\left( \left( \left( q - 1 \right)d + \left( 1:d \right),\left( r - 1 \right)d + \left( 1:d \right) \right) \right) = \overset{\sim}{B_{1}}\left( :,:,slice \right)$$ $\;\;\text{for}\;\; q = 1...\sqrt{d},r = 1...\sqrt{d},\quad slice = 1,2,..d$.

The output $I^{\prime}$ of size $n \times n$ is passed on as an input to the diffusion subroutine for further processing.Fig. 3Schematic of the cube generation from a square image.

### 3.1.2. Diffusion subroutine: {#sec3.1.2}

This phase aims to modify the pixel values in such a way that the resulting cipher has a uniformly distributed histogram and maximum entropy, thereby giving a noise-like look. The diffusion algorithm presented here implements a delayed logistic map [@b33]. This equation is an archetypical example of simple mathematical equations giving rise to a complex mathematical structure, when the dissipative parameter $\mu \in \left\lbrack 3.57,4 \right\rbrack$. The following equations define the delayed logistic map as follows: $$x_{i + 1} = \mu x_{i}\left( 1 - x_{i} \right)$$For $\mu = 4$, the equivalent form studied for its statistical properties like auto-correlation, limit cycles etc., is $$x_{i} = \sin^{2}\left( 2^{i}\theta\pi \right) = \frac{\left( 1 - \cos\left( \theta\pi 2^{i + 1} \right) \right)}{2}$$where $\theta \in \left\lbrack 0,\pi \right\rbrack$ satisfies $x_{0} = \frac{1}{2}\left( 1 - \cos\left( 2\pi\theta \right) \right)$. It was shown in [@b34] that points from this chaotic sequence at a sampling distance of $s = 15$ are statistically approximately independent and identically distributed. This property is necessary for randomness and incoherence. [Fig. 4](#fig4){ref-type="fig"} presents 3 subfigures illustrating the following three properties:

•The orbit of the chaotic points generated by the map with $\mu = 3.9$, can be seen to haphazardly, indicating chaos.•Cobweb diagram of the logistic map showing a filled out plane, which implies that there is an infinite number of non-repeating values dense in the unit interval $\left\lbrack 0,1 \right\rbrack$. iii) The bifurcation diagram suggests that period-doubling cascade starts beyond $\mu = 3.57$ ($\mu$ is the Bifurcation parameter against which we plot to check the chaotic nature of the map) and which implies the onset of chaos.

The steps involved in the diffusion subroutine are as follows:Fig. 4Chaotic nature of the logistic map :**The Orbit diagram** corresponding to $\mu = 3.9$ indicates that neither the iterates converge to a fixed point nor do they oscillate around a finite set of states, rather the behavior is erratic, this state is called Chaos, **Cobweb diagram** for $\mu = 3.9$ showing an outward spiral filling and a filled out area indicating an infinite number of non-repeating iterates indicating chaos, **Bifurcation diagram** shows the period doubling cascade which is the onset of chaos at $\mu = 3.544$, which shows a self similar nature of the entire diagram depicting chaos.

D1:The logistic map [(4)](#fd4){ref-type="disp-formula"} is iterated $n^{2}s + k$ times, where $s = 15$ is the sampling distance, and $k$ is the threshold limit to discard the initial iterates of the chaotic map. The iterates are properly digitized using the equation: $$X_{i} = \left( \left\lfloor 10^{14}x_{i} \right\rfloor \right)\;\operatorname{mod}\; 255$$The vector is reshaped to form a matrix $X$ of dimensions $n \times n$.D2:An intermediate cipher $T$ is generated by the equation $$T = \left( \overset{\sim}{I} \oplus X \right)$$where $\oplus$ denotes the bit-wise XOR operation.D3:The partial cipher $\mathbf{C}$ is obtained by implementing a Grid-based Diffusion Approach (GbDA) [@b34] on the temporary cipher given by the following equation: $$\mathbf{C}\left( x,y \right) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
{\left( sum\left( I \right)mod\quad\quad 256 \right) \oplus T\left( x,y \right);\quad\quad\quad\text{for}\; x = 1,\;\; y = 1...n.\quad} \\
{\mathbf{C}\left( x - 1,y \right) \oplus \mathbf{C}\left( x - 1,y + 1 \right) \oplus T\left( x,y \right);\quad} \\
{\quad\text{for}\; x = 2....n,\;\; y = 1.\quad} \\
{\mathbf{C}\left( x,y - 1 \right) \oplus \mathbf{C}\left( x - 1,y \right) \oplus \mathbf{C}\left( x - 1,y + 1 \right) \oplus T\left( x,y \right);\quad} \\
{\quad\text{for}\; x = 2....n,\; y = 2....n - 1.\quad} \\
{\mathbf{C}\left( x,y - 1 \right) \oplus \mathbf{C}\left( x - 1,y - 1 \right) \oplus \mathbf{C}\left( x - 1,y \right) \oplus T\left( x,y \right);\quad} \\
{\quad\text{for}\; x = 2....n\;,\; y = n.\quad} \\
\end{array} \right)$$where, $\oplus$ denotes bit-wise XOR, and $sum\left( I \right)$ is inserted in the head data to be transmitted. The set of equations in [(8)](#fd8){ref-type="disp-formula"}, are imperative to the algorithm, since these are the equations that implement the diffusion of the intensities in the cipher and generate the uniform looking histogram of the partial cipher. The diffusion phase is set for a maximum of $ite_{D} = 17$ rounds, in which the value of the pair ($x_{0}$, $\mu$) is changed until the second round. [Fig. 5](#fig5){ref-type="fig"} gives the encryption results on the four images used in [Fig. 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"}.

Fig. 5Pre-encryption algorithm results: Original images are shown (left to right) in the first row, and the second row illustrates the corresponding cipher images by the proposed pre-encryption subroutine.

3.2. Encoding phase {#sec3.2}
-------------------

In this phase, VMCI is generated by applying the Integer Wavelet Transform (IWT) and Pairing function. This phase has two sub-routines in it, a:) Encoding sub-routine, b:) Embedding Phase. The encoding phase uses the Cantor-like pairing function to encode $4$ pixels to a single-pixel intensity in a reversible manner. A pairing function [@b35], [@b36] in mathematics is an invertible function constructed to show the equinumerosity of the sets $\mathbb{N}^{2}$ and $\mathbb{N}$. A modified and elegant pairing function [@b36] that pairs the two numbers depending on the magnitude of each number is defined as $$\left. \sigma:\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}\rightarrow\mathbb{N},\text{such~that}\quad\quad\sigma\left( n_{1},n_{2} \right) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
{n_{1} + n_{2}^{2},\quad} & {\text{if~}n_{1} < n_{2}} \\
{n_{1}^{2} + n_{1} + n_{2},\quad} & {\text{otherwise}.} \\
\end{array} \right) \right.$$ [Fig. 6](#fig6){ref-type="fig"} gives the schematic description of Eq. [(9)](#fd9){ref-type="disp-formula"}. A justification for the invertibility of the pairing function is given in the [Appendix](#appendix){ref-type="sec"} section. The steps involved in the encoding are given as:

E1:Reshape the partial cipher $\mathbf{C}$ into a vector $\mathbf{c}$ of length $n^{2}$, and divide it into two sub-vectors $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{1}}$, $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{2}}$ of length $\left. n^{2}\slash 2 \right.$ each, in the following manner: $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{1}}$: all odd indexed elements and $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{2}}$: all even indexed elements.E2:Join these two vectors $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{1}}$ and $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{2}}$ into a single vector $\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{1}}$ element-wise as follows: $$\left. \mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{1}}\left( k \right) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
{\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{1}}\left( k \right) + \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{2}}\left( k \right)^{2},\quad} & {\text{if~}\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{1}}\left( k \right) < \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{2}}\left( k \right)} \\
{\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{1}}\left( k \right)^{2} + \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{1}}\left( k \right) + \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{2}}\left( k \right),\quad} & {\text{otherwise}.} \\
\end{array} \right)\text{for}\quad\quad k = 0,1,\ldots...n^{2}\slash 2 \right.$$Repeat Step **E1** and **E2** on the base vector $\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{1}}$. Hence, the final output of the double encoding is a vector $\mathbf{w}_{\mathbf{1}}$ of length $\left. n^{2}\slash 4 \right.$. Reshape this vector into a matrix $\mathbf{W}_{\mathbf{1}}$ of size $\left. n\slash 2\quad \times n\slash 2 \right.$.E3:Input a host image $\mathbf{H}$ of size $n \times n$, apply the Integer Wavelet Transform (IWT) to get the 4 sub-bands namely: Approximation part (AH), Horizontal Detail part (HH), Vertical Detail part (VH), Diagonal Detail part (DH). To get an integer to integer mapping, we use the lifting scheme [@b28] of the wavelet transform.E4:The HH, VH, DH subbands contain values from $\mathbb{Z}$, before applying the Pairing function we introduce a pre-processing module that involves mapping of $\mathbb{Z}$ to $\mathbb{Z}^{+} \cup \left\{ 0 \right\}$. For this we deploy a bijective function between $\mathbb{Z}$ and $\mathbb{Z}^{+} \cup \left\{ 0 \right\}$ as $$\left. f:\quad\mathbb{Z}\rightarrow\quad\mathbb{Z}^{+} \cup \left\{ 0 \right\} \right.$$ $$f\left( x \right) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
{- 2x,\quad} & {\text{if~}x \leq 0} \\
{2x - 1,\quad} & {\text{otherwise}.} \\
\end{array} \right)$$RemarkSince, the maximum value of a pixel in the partial cipher can be $255$ so the maximum outcome of the first pairing function can be $2^{16} - 1$ which is the highest value that an unsigned integer 16-bit can hold. Similarly, the maximum from the second pairing function can be $2^{32} - 1$ which is the highest value that an unsigned int 32-bit can hold. Since dealing with such high magnitude numbers would slow the algorithm, therefore we decided to divide these values by $10^{8}$ which gives 42.94967295. Further this factor of $10^{8}$ serves as a key for our algorithm as we need to extract the digits from this as 4,2 and the fractional part 0.94967295. A factor of $10^{9}$ would make the digits as 0,4 and the fractional part as 0.94967295, which would substantially affect the further embedding process. Now, without this factor of $10^{8}$ we would not be able to divide the numbers and distribute it to the sub-bands of the reference image. For instance, if we were to divide $2^{32} - 1$ say using the scheme $429,496$, and $7295$ and tried to embed them in the sub-bands, then this would distort the image. [Fig. 7](#fig7){ref-type="fig"} illustrates the effect of $DF$ in the final output and the choice of taking $DF = 10^{8}$.

Fig. 6Schematic of the pairing function defined in Eqs. [(9)](#fd9){ref-type="disp-formula"}, [(10)](#fd10){ref-type="disp-formula"}.Fig. 7The effect of choosing a proper digitizing factor: First row (Left to right) VMCI with $DF = 10$, VMCI with $DF = 10^{2}$, VMCI with $DF = 10^{3}$, VMCI with $DF = 10^{4}$. Second row (Left to right) VMCI with $DF = 10^{5}$, VMCI with $DF = 10^{6}$, VMCI with $DF = 10^{7}$, VMCI with $DF = 10^{8}$.

3.3. Embedding phase {#sec3.3}
--------------------

E5:Generate matrices $G_{1},G_{2},G_{3},G_{4},G_{5}$ in the following manner: $$G_{1} = \left\lfloor W_{1} \right\rfloor$$$$G_{2} = W_{1} - G_{1}$$$$G_{3} = \left\lfloor G_{1}\slash 10 \right\rfloor$$$$G_{4} = G_{1}\;\operatorname{mod}\; 10$$$$G_{5} = HH + G_{2}$$ where $\left\lfloor . \right\rfloor$ denotes the floor of the values taken elementwise.E6:Apply the pairing function to the pairs $\left( VH,G_{3} \right)$ and $\left( DH,G_{4} \right)$ obtained in step E$3$ and E$5$ to obtain $VH_{new},DH_{new}$.E7:Apply the inverse-IWT on $AH,G_{5},VH_{new},DH_{new}$ to get the final VMCI $\overset{\sim}{\mathbf{C}}$.

The schematic representation of the proposed encryption scheme is illustrated in [Fig. 8](#fig8){ref-type="fig"}, and the execution of the proposed scheme on a 2 × 2 matrix is shown in [Fig. 9](#fig9){ref-type="fig"}.

Fig. 8Schematic of the Encryption Algorithm.Fig. 9Encryption Algorithm on a 2 × 2 matrix.Table 2Parameters set with their definition.Parameter-definitionParameter symbolParameter definition$\overset{\sim}{C}$VMCI$x_{0}$initial state of the logistic map with values in $\left( 0,1 \right)$$\mu$Chaotic parameter $\in \left( 3.57,4 \right\rbrack$$q_{x}$Parameter of the Arnold 3-D map, with range $\left\{ 1,2,\ldots,16 \right\}$$s$Delay parameter in the Logistic equation with range $\left\{ 15,16,\ldots,30 \right\}$$\left( sum\left( I\left( : \right) \right)\;\operatorname{mod}\; 256 \right)$Sum of all the pixels in the original image modulo 256, with range $\left\{ 0,1,..255 \right\}$$ite_{A}$Iterations of the Arnold 3-D map, with range $\left\{ 2,3,\ldots,9 \right\}$$ite_{D}$Iterations of the Diffusion scheme $\left\{ 2,3,\ldots,17 \right\}$$DF$Digitizing factor used in the pairing process with value $10^{8}$$wav$Wavelet used in the decomposition of the reference image

3.4. Decryption algorithm {#sec3.4}
-------------------------

As mentioned earlier, the proposed scheme guarantees for the perfect reconstruction of the original image and the cover image. The entire encryption-decryption process can be mathematically expressed as inverse processes to each other given by the following functions: $$\left. E:\mathbf{O} \times \mathbf{R} \times \mathbf{K}\rightarrow\mathbf{C}\quad\text{and}\quad D:\mathbf{C} \times \mathbf{K}\rightarrow\mathbf{O} \times \mathbf{R} \right.$$where, $$E\left( O,R,K \right) = C$$$$D\left( C,K \right) = \left( I,O \right)$$ $E$: Encryption function, $\mathbf{O}$: Set of all plain text/Original Images to be encrypted, $\mathbf{R}$: Set of all reference images that serve as cover images, $\mathbf{K}$: Set of all possible keys for encryption, $\mathbf{C}$: Set of all possible cipher images, $D$: Decryption function.

For a perfect reconstruction scheme $I = \overset{\sim}{I}$, to verify the perfect reconstruction claim, we give Algorithm 1, a schematic is give in [Fig. 10](#fig10){ref-type="fig"} that supports our claim that $I = \overset{\sim}{I}$. Moreover, we have $R = \overset{\sim}{R}$, i.e., the decrypted original and the reference image are recovered perfectly. An important step in the Algorithm is $Step49$, which partially reconstructs the original image and acts as an inverse of step $E5$ of the Embedding Phase. The list of functions and symbols and used in the algorithm are given in [Table 2](#tbl2){ref-type="table"}.

4. Key-space analysis {#sec4}
=====================

The security of the proposed cryptosystem is based on: (1) large key space to resist brute force attacks; (2) strong permutation property to decorrelate pixels; (3) large amount of diffusion to give the partial cipher a random appearance. The key space of the proposed encryption scheme, as calculated below, is $2^{277}$. To provide sufficient security against brute-force attacks the key-space should be $> 2^{100}$ as given by Alvarez et al. in [@b37]. An increase in the number of keys used in the algorithm enlarges the key space of the system, and thus makes it more secure against brute force attacks of any adversary. With the advances in technologies and computer speeds, any algorithm with a key space of less than $2^{128}$ is termed as insecure [@b38]. For the proposed algorithm, the key-stream can be considered as a vector $\left( x_{0},\mu,q_{x},s,sum\left( I\left( : \right) \right),ite_{A},ite_{D},DF,wav \right)$, where the definition of each symbol is given in [Table 2](#tbl2){ref-type="table"}. Floating point precision is chosen as 10^−15^ to comply with IEEE-754-binary64 standards [@b39]. Thus the total key-space of the algorithm becomes $$Key - Space = \left( 10^{15}\cdot 10^{15} \right)\cdot\left( 10^{15}\cdot 10^{15} \right)\cdot 2^{27}\cdot\left( 10^{8}\cdot 10^{15} \right)\cdot 37 \approx 2^{277}$$

Since the key-space of the algorithm can be seen to be much larger than the threshold, the encryption can be termed as safe against brute-force attacks.

5. Results and discussions {#sec5}
==========================

5.1. Encryption analysis {#sec5.1}
------------------------

This section presents the qualitative and quantitative results to validate our claims of generating a secure VMCI. We use 'Lena', 'Elaine', 'Boat' as the original image, and 'Mandril', 'Man and Women', 'House' as the reference image. The size of each image in this study is 512 × 512. These original and reference images are shown in [Fig. 11](#fig11){ref-type="fig"}. The encryption results of the proposed algorithm are compared against [@b27], [@b29]. The execution of all experiments have been done on Matlab R2019a platform with a PC having Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620-0 processor and 16.0 Ghz RAM.

(i)Execution Time Analysis : The execution time of the proposed scheme depends upon two factors, (i) the execution time of pre-encryption subroutine, and (ii) the VMCI generating phase. Since the focus of this study is efficient VMCI generation, we give the results based on the embedding and the VMCI generation phase. For this, the original images of sizes $n \times n$ have been taken, where $n = 256,512$, the corresponding VMCI generated are of the same size as claimed. The results obtained in [Table 3](#tbl3){ref-type="table"} presents with the numerical values for the embedding phase. We also perform the time complexity analysis comparison against algorithms reported in [@b27] and [@b29], to highlight the efficiency of the proposed scheme. The time complexity results are the average of the results obtained after performing each test on $50$ different images. For schemes [@b27] and [@b29] to get a VMCI of size 512 × 512, the input reference image is of size 1024 × 1024, however in our scheme it remains 512 × 512. Therefore, the final time of the embedding and VMCI generation given in [Table 3](#tbl3){ref-type="table"} is based on the size of the final VMCI. As can be seen, the algorithm takes comparatively lesser time in generating the VMCI, than its counterpart algorithms.(ii)Histogram analysis: The main objective of generating VMCI, is that the final encrypted images should look structurally coherent and visually meaningful. Contrary to this, traditional cryptosystems convert the original image into a noise-like appearance, giving a uniform looking histogram of the final cipher. The histogram of the VMCI is plotted in the last row of [Fig. 12](#fig12){ref-type="fig"}, which represents a meaningful/coherent image.(iii)Original Image Variation attack: This refers to the change in the cipher corresponding to a minuscule change in the original image. For a secure cryptosystem, even the slightest alteration in the original image must produce an entirely different cipher image. This feature is a straightforward result of the diffusion scheme implemented using the chaotic iterates of the logistic map. The security against this attack, restricts an adversary from picking and choosing a set of plain/original images and drawing out inferences from the ciphers obtained by encrypting each one of them. The metric that we have used for this test is the Number of Pixel Change Rate (NPCR) metric to claim the security of the image cryptosystem. The NPCR test [@b40] measures the number of different pixels in the original and the modified cipher. Mathematically, it is given by $D_{ij} =$ $\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
{1,\;\;\; ifC_{ij} \neq C_{ij}^{\prime}\quad} \\
{0,\;\;\; ifC_{ij} = C_{ij}^{\prime}\quad} \\
\end{array} \right)$ $$NPCR = \left( \frac{\sum\limits_{i = 1}^{M}\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{N}D_{ij}}{MN} \right)\cdot 100\text{\%}$$where $C$ and $C^{\prime}$ are the original and modified ciphers respectively, $M$ and $N$ gives the dimensions of the original and cipher images. For the grayscale images ideal $NPCR$ values are $\geq 99.6075$ [@b40]. We subject our cryptosystem to this test with the following settings: Encrypt each image twice, first with the original image, and then with the slightly changed image. The modification in the original image is the change in the pixel intensities by '1'. For ex. $255$ is changed to $254$, and this tiny change would not affect the appearance and texture of the image. However, the cryptosystem should adapt to this change and reflect this in the final cipher. [Table 4](#tbl4){ref-type="table"} gives the numerical scores of this metric on images used in [Fig. 11](#fig11){ref-type="fig"}. As can be seen, the scores are high and thus back our claim of a secure cryptosystem. [Fig. 13](#fig13){ref-type="fig"} gives the edges of the image obtained by the difference of the original and modified cipher using the Canny-edge detector. As can be seen, there is no coherent edge structure that can leak any useful information to the adversary based on the chosen plain-text attack.(iv)Key-Sensitivity Analysis: Key-sensitivity is an attribute that a robust encryption algorithm should possess to produce an entirely different output due to a slight alteration in the encrypting keys. We have subjected our algorithm to this test by changing the set of encryption keys at the time of decryption. The encryption-decryption keys used in this test are listed in [Table 5](#tbl5){ref-type="table"}. One of the important keys in our algorithm is the wavelet involved in the VMCI generation. We change the 'Haar' wavelet to 'Lazy' wavelet in this sensitivity analysis. The 'Lazy' wavelet involves the sub-sampling of even and odd indexed samples and works precisely as polyphase representation used in designing filter banks [@b41].Our algorithm boasts of the perfect reconstruction of both the original and the reference image. In [Fig. 14](#fig14){ref-type="fig"} for every parameter that is changed, the corresponding decrypted and reconstructed versions of the original and the reference image are shown, respectively. It is clearly visible that the even the reference image is not perfectly reconstructed when the key is changed (second row of the figure). Moreover, wrongly decrypted image give a noise-like appearance. Therefore, we can claimed that the proposed algorithm is highly sensitive to key-changes.(v)Occlusion Attack: The transmission of a digital image over the internet may involve a data loss either through the network or can be a deliberate attempt by an adversary to destroy the integrity of an image. The encryption algorithm should be designed in such a way that even if there is some occlusion in the transmitted digital image, the receiver at the other end may still be able to extract visually meaningful information upon decryption of the image. The amount or level of information extracted depends upon the level of occlusion, so we have subjected the VMCI to different levels of data losses and recovered the original image with a sufficient amount of visual quality, as can be seen in [Fig. 15](#fig15){ref-type="fig"}.(vi)Noise Attacks: The transmission of images may involve contamination in terms of the addition of different types of noises. A noise can be termed as any unwanted signal that has high variations with the true signal. The noises that arise in digital images may be due to some technical reasons like data compression, aliasing, etc. The other source is due to human intervention to intentionally disrupt the images by adding unwanted frequencies in the VMCI so that even the authorized party cannot get information about the original image. A reliable and robust algorithm should be flexible enough to resist noise attacks to facilitate near-perfect or visually meaningful decryption. We have subjected our cryptosystem to 'Salt and Pepper' noises with varying densities: 0.2, 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 . The corresponding decrypted images after applying the median filtering are presented in [Fig. 16](#fig16){ref-type="fig"}. [Fig. 16](#fig16){ref-type="fig"} also contains row $4$ and $5$ that shows the reconstructed images i.e., original and the reference image, recovered in algorithm [@b29]. As can be seen, the results are better, especially when it comes to the reconstruction quality of the reference image. Numerical results based on this test are summarized in [Table 6](#tbl6){ref-type="table"}. As can be inferred from both [Fig. 16](#fig16){ref-type="fig"} and [Table 6](#tbl6){ref-type="table"}, both the original image as well as the reference image can be recovered with a sufficient amount of visual quality. Moreover, the algorithm fairs pretty well and seems to outperforms the algorithm presented in [@b29].

Table 3Comparative analysis of Time complexity.Time (in seconds)VMCI size[@b29][@b27]Proposed256 × 2560.2282920.1410190.018452512 × 5120.6086530.3133050.110944Table 4NPCR results from plain text/image variation.ImageNPCRLena99.4171Elaine99.4160Cameraman99.5594Peppers99.3996Couple99.2661Scenery99.4392Fig. 10Schematic of the decryption algorithm.Fig. 11Images used for the Algorithm --- Top Row: Original Images, Bottom Row: Reference Image.Fig. 12Histogram analysis: First Row --- Original Images , Second Row --- The generated VMCI, Third Row --- Original images histograms, Fourth Row --- VMCI histograms.Table 5Encryption--Decryption keys.KeysParameterEncryption keyDecryption key$x_{0}$0.220.21999999999999$\mu$43.9999999999999$s$1516$\left( ite_{A},q_{x} \right)$$\left( 1,1 \right)$$\left( 2,1 \right)$$ite_{D}$12$DF$$10^{8}$$10^{9}$$wav$$‘haar^{\prime}$$‘lazy^{\prime}$Step 49 of Algorithm 1$F = \left( E\left( 2,: \right) + E\left( 3,: \right) + 10 \ast E\left( 4,: \right) \right) \ast DF$$F = \left( E\left( 2,: \right) + 10 \ast E\left( 3,: \right) + E\left( 4,: \right) \right) \ast DF$Fig. 13Edge detection results: First Row (left to right) shows the edges of the difference of ciphers corresponding to Lena, Elaine, Cameraman images . Second Row (left to right) shows the edges of the difference of ciphers corresponding to Peppers, Couple and Scenery images.Fig. 14Key-Sensitivity Analysis. First row: (a) Wrongly decrypted image when 'wavelet' is changed, (b) Wrongly decrypted image when $x_{0}$ is changed, (c) Wrongly decrypted image when $\mu$ is changed, (d) Wrongly decrypted image when $s$ is changed, (e) Wrongly decrypted image when $ite_{A}$ is changed. Second Row : Corresponding decrypted reference image. Third Row (f) Wrongly decrypted image when $ite_{D}$ is changed, (g) Wrongly decrypted image when $DF$ is changed, (h) Wrongly decrypted image when Step $49$ of Algorithm 1 is changed, (i) Correctly decrypted image. Fourth Row: Corresponding reconstructed reference image.Fig. 15Occlusion attacks with varying portions of the VMCI deleted: First row from left to right: 50 × 50 block set to zero intensity, 100 × 100 block set to zero intensity, 200 × 200 block set to zero intensity, triangular block of size 150 × 150 block set to zero intensity. The corresponding decrypted images are shown in the second row from left to right.Fig. 16Noise attack: First row (left to right) : VMCI with Salt & Pepper noise with intensities 0.2, 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01. Second row shows the corresponding decrypted original images, and the third row shows the corresponding reconstructed reference images. Fourth and fifth rows show the results of decrypted original images and the reconstructed reference images with algorithm given in [@b29].

5.2. Steganalysis {#sec5.2}
-----------------

Steganalysis is the technology to deal with steganography. Since digital steganography conceals information into the carrier image without any obvious visible distortions to it, therefore it becomes imperative to develop tools and algorithms to find out those subtle manipulations and hence the secret. The steganalysis methods can be broadly classified into six major attacks : (a) Stego-only attack, (b) Known cover attack, (c) Known message attack, (d) Known stego attack, (e) Chosen stego attack, (f) Chosen message attack. We can be safe in assuming that the adversary has with it only the VMCI/Stego-image without any other discernible information and tries to draw out conclusions about the hidden information. We consider the following two famous steganalysis tests on our stego-image [@b42].

(I)**Statistical Test:** The Chi-square test for image steganalysis [@b42] is based on comparing Pair-of-Values (POV) observed frequencies with their expected frequencies to calculate the $p$-value, which is the probability of having something embedded in the image. The basic principle of this test works with the assumption that when an image is embedded with secret information, the LSB values change in such a way that the number of these POV pairs become nearly equal while they differ when nothing is embedded. We performed this test on five images giving quantitative and qualitative results on each. The first four images are the VMCI generated by our algorithm, and the fifth is the stego-image generated by LSB embedding. [Table 7](#tbl7){ref-type="table"} gives the quantitative results of this test, while [Fig. 17](#fig17){ref-type="fig"} presented the qualitative results. The proposed VMCI has a very low probability of getting detected for a secret message, whereas the probability is 0.999999432510001 in the conventional LSB embedded stego-image. As a comparative analysis, we embed all the encrypted images from [Fig. 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"} into an 8-bit'Lena' image and perform the chi-square test on the resultant stego-image. The embedding is done by flipping the LSB of the cover image to match the LSB of the secret image. We assume that the number of bits in the secret image is almost equal to the number of pixels in the cover image to satisfy the necessary condition that each pixel contains at most one embedded bit. To assure this constraint, we embed the LSB of the secret image of size 512 × 512 into the LSB of the cover image. [Table 8](#tbl8){ref-type="table"}, [Table 9](#tbl9){ref-type="table"} shows the results of the stego-image generated by embedding the AES encrypted image. One can observe that the probability of detecting the embedded data is higher in this case as compared to the VMCI.(II)**RS test:** To analyze the stego-image for the presence of a secret, Fridrich et al. in [@b43] developed a method that focussed on dividing the image into three groups known as Regular (R), Singular (S) and Unused (U) group. The method involved choosing a special discriminant function for the variation of the intensities in the image as $f\left( p_{1},p_{2},\ldots,p_{n} \right) = \sum_{i = 1}^{n - 1}\left| p_{i + 1} - p_{i} \right|$. The classification for a group of pixels $G$ is done as follows: $$G \in \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
{R,\quad\text{if}\quad f\left( F_{M}\left( G \right) \right) > f\left( G \right)\quad} \\
{S,\quad\text{if}\quad f\left( F_{M}\left( G \right) \right) < f\left( G \right)\quad} \\
{U,\quad\text{otherwise}\quad} \\
\end{array} \right)$$where $G$ is the 2 × 2 pixel group, $M$ is a specific vector $\begin{bmatrix}
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
\end{bmatrix}$ and the function $F$ is defined as: $$F_{1}\left( p \right) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
{p + 1,\quad\text{if}\quad p = 2k\quad\text{for~some}\quad k\quad} \\
{p - 1,\quad\text{if}\quad p = 2k + 1\quad\text{for~some}\quad k\quad} \\
\end{array} \right)$$and $\quad F_{0}\left( p \right) = p$. For example $f\left( F_{M}\left( \begin{bmatrix}
163 & 163 & 162 & 162 \\
\end{bmatrix} \right) \right) = f\left( \begin{bmatrix}
163 & 162 & 163 & 162 \\
\end{bmatrix} \right) = 3$. Parsing through the entire image in blocks of two, we calculate the total number of $R_{M},S_{M}$, $R_{M}$, and $S_{M}$ denote the regular and singular groups indexed by the vector $M$. Similarly, we calculate $R_{- M},S_{- M}$ by replacing the vector $M$ by $- M$ and the function $F$ as $F_{- 1}\left( p \right) = F_{1}\left( x + 1 \right) - 1$. The analysis of these values gives the percentage of pixels likely to be embedded in the stego-image. The inferences made by these analyses is that the difference between the $R_{M}$ and $S_{M}$ would be meager. Whereas, the difference between $R_{- M}$ and $S_{- M}$ would increase with the increase in the length of data embedded. We subjected our VMCI to this test to find out the percentage of embedded data that the RS analysis gives. To give a comparative analysis, we subject two more images, (i) Lena-Stego image with LSB embedding to bring out the clear advantages of the proposed scheme over LSB embedding, and (ii) Original image to bring out the difference in the values between the LSB-embedded, VMCI and the original image. The results in [Table 10](#tbl10){ref-type="table"} show that VMCI can withstand any steganalysis based on the RS analysis. To emphasize our claim that the AES encrypted stego-image is susceptible to the RS-analysis, we give the results on the eight images used in [Fig. 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"} in [Table 11](#tbl11){ref-type="table"}. The analysis of the results vividly depicts that this method of AES combined with steganography is not at par with our proposed method of VMCI generation.

Table 6Noise Attack Evaluation based on PNSR and SSIM.NoiseOriginal ImageReference ImageNameIntensityPSNRSSIMPSNRSSIMSalt& Pepper0.217.06540.334222.88730.67490.120.94800.583324.40060.75870.0526.17110.806024.90740.79450.0131.59970.932325.23910.8097Table 7Chi-square results indicating probability of embedded data in the VMCI.PixelsProbability of embeddingScannedLenaBarbaraGoldhillMan& WomanLena-LSB0%000005%0.0037772506447340.7573709613076040.0141286230239880.2329083903859580.99716974504466710%0.0001892624030810.0073584761976400.0006017088619760.0005251475913420.99953571310751415%0.1596874395169640.0083787884917590.1041944056539790.0018220870800910.99999709935791620%0.1975644826280500.0087538309947120.1078152021109160.1315539364192350.99999540121748525%0.1156440475342810.0066044981607670.1316851827206940.2358906130943720.99999862814017530%0.0411962214267140.0194276522576140.0276654887375360.4165351276216780.99993949100519835%0.0126484877901850.0009513030221500.0076587463260810.4169647131165200.99996555300714040%0.0041520638854840.0025033518152300.0017646617858220.5998629713092530.99999085065685045%0.0056275166546070.0049172360250550.0039673626678010.7597417895688030.99999943251000150%0.0014194120948050.0436647956288370.0058960302595450.5426739468512350.99999409536932155%0.0014494168054630.0986242169948320.0071720599990590.0022062275654210.99999611356196860%0.0006425839382350.0594525673682090.0051024154893549.06134789424584E−090.99999911273131965%0.0004526413912780.0088001990869880.0009419994115831.07580611086178E−120.99999213697555170%0.0001841490970730.0002445175372650.00064164853572200.99999743998502175%4.38321393734231E−056.24875671332292E−050.00012113813409700.99999822977080080%7.81896744317390E−069.82757254275324E−061.07830250701824E−0500.99999184771840585%3.30912680657214E−058.73761807862472E−064.06641730900104E−0500.99998945208885990%1.48032490698835E−050.0009175432875812027.62291355227429E−0600.99996820164711695%2.07152079512163E−060.0006890143514408645.63310389667393E−0700.999995729704524100%2.20578545351291E−060.0002618694952127852.77643488089119E−0700.999996461844258Table 8Chi-square results indicating probability of embedded AES encrypted data in the cover image.PixelsProbability of embeddingScannedSierpinskyTuxFarhanHilbert Curve0%00005%0.9308746120.9653336780.9137620090.83161417710%0.999577540.9008294870.9904267410.99996690315%0.9988644880.7920359970.9950643690.99999350720%0.985796390.7449167090.7172544750.9999989925%0.9933582440.6530611620.6194436450.99999679130%0.9968538210.3274942260.4071743630.99999970335%0.9988916150.1109929060.1702577710.99999786840%0.9998283870.0295716340.0945032940.99999522445%0.9997311090.016396840.058363790.99998996150%0.9993965114.85E−030.0140884230.99963862755%0.9939712382.17E−032.25E−030.99883430160%0.994714411.88E−042.57E−040.99817145565%0.9957443011.13E−045.34E−050.99743839770%0.9963839583.92E−051.08E−060.99765128375%0.9928433236.07E−063.97E−080.99757098480%0.9834983288.92E−073.74E−090.995024985%0.9754306552.16E−071.40E−090.99264837690%0.9901984771.14E−075.22E−100.99201068595%0.9772151831.09E−091.32E−090.993528914100%0.9922965272.45E−105.86E−120.989760445Table 9Chi-square results indicating probability of embedded AES encrypted data in the cover image.PixelsProbability of embeddingScannedGoldhillLenaBarbaraMan&Woman0%00005%0.6941630.9787650.8489650.98789310%0.9873860.9922530.9999710.99966815%0.9601510.8636080.999860.99949420%0.9048670.8885050.9995160.99950825%0.9261740.6345150.9938430.99998330%0.8270150.4636050.9970940.9999835%8.20E−010.3445630.9986590.9999840%6.81E−010.0939960.9989940.99989745%6.84E−010.0155560.9993420.99954950%5.13E−010.0019710.9960350.99975155%2.24E−015.00E−050.990640.99836460%0.0293564.00E−050.9963010.99720665%0.012331.68E−050.9994260.99975670%0.0025596.47E−070.9992990.99964875%0.0007074.20E−080.999810.99958180%0.0001739.95E−100.9997920.99972885%0.0001091.88E−100.999840.99953890%3.05E−051.07E−110.9998650.99925295%9.21E−065.53E−130.9999590.999349100%1.02E−061.09E−140.9999840.998509

5.3. Comparative analysis with existing work {#sec5.3}
--------------------------------------------

A comparison of the existing schemes of [@b27], [@b29] with the method presented in the proposed work is carried out concerning their embedding algorithms and give a numerical justification of why our proposed method surpasses them. One of the main contributions of this work lies in the perfect reconstruction of the reference image, which is a crucial drawback in the schemes presented in [@b27], [@b29]. In this section, we give the reconstruction quality of the reference image in terms of the PSNR value and two other important parameters that capture the details in an image. We give a brief description of the two schemes to highlight the areas to which we have proposed a solution.

Scheme proposed in [@b29]: Although the embedding algorithm is a new one, some substantial improvements can be made. The first step of the embedding algorithm is the rounding-off error that gets involved in the reference image due to the equation $$R^{\prime} = \left\lceil {R + \frac{235}{255}R} \right\rceil$$This step itself produces the rounding off error, which is propagated when the algorithm takes the binary representation of the values in $R^{\prime}$. Secondly, in the middle of the embedding phase, when the actual embedding takes place, for each of the sub-bands of $R^{\prime}$ obtained, the 3 lsb of $H,V$, sub-band and 2 lsb of $D$ are discarded. It results into an irreversible process, and thus at the time of decryption, the details of the reference image are lost, and hence we see a blurred image. Third, for every image $I$ of size $m^{\prime} \times n^{\prime}$, the reference image being taken is $2m^{\prime} \times 2n^{\prime}$. This increases the embedding time and hence the overall encryption time.Scheme proposed in [@b27]: The embedding process, implemented makes use of the Lifting Wavelet Transform to get the sub-bands $A,H,V,D$ of the reference image $R$. At the time of embedding the $V,D$ are discarded to hold the values of the cipher image, this again is an irreversible process and hence at the time of decryption, the key features of the reference image are lost. The numerical results in [Table 12](#tbl12){ref-type="table"} clearly show that the proposed scheme does produce a perfect reconstruction of the reference image, a key-feature missing in the other algorithms. As expected, the PSNR and SSIM count is low for the algorithms in [@b27], [@b29] and quite high for the proposed one. [Table 13](#tbl13){ref-type="table"} gives the PSNR, SSIM, and ESR values between the VMCI and the Reference image. The analysis from [Table 13](#tbl13){ref-type="table"}, highlights the efficacy of the proposed scheme over the previous ones based on the PSNR, SSIM, ESR metric. While the PSNR and SSIM are well-known metrics, the detail about ESR can be seen in [@b44]. The ESR value is high for the aforementioned algorithms, which indicates the loss in details and edges, while it is low for the proposed algorithm showing that the edges are not distorted to large extent. The reference image and the original image in our analysis are of size 512 × 512, and the size of the original image and reference image used in the other two algorithms are of size 512 × 512 and 1024 × 1024 respectively, and the pre-encryption algorithm used for them is the same as given in [@b45]. As can be seen, both the versions of our proposed schemes (i) guarantee perfect reconstruction of the reference image, (ii) the PSNR, SSIM, and ESR score of the 'Haar' version is better than the existing schemes, whereas the Le-Gall-Tabatabai 5/3 fairs even better on the PSNR, SSIM metric.

Fig. 17Results of Chi-Square statistic on the VMCI corresponding to [Table 7](#tbl7){ref-type="table"}: First row (left to right) Lena VMCI, Barbara VMCI, Elaine VMCI. Second row (left to right) Couple VMCI, Lena Stego image with LSB embedding.Table 10RS analysis of the VMCI.Images$R_{M}$$S_{M}$$R_{- M}$$S_{- M}$% of Embedded textBarbara VMCI181321345418155134340.0045Lena VMCI194181335319430132480.0093Goldhill VMCI174131396317447140280.0040Cameraman VMCI221771079322399108400.0079Lena-LSB stego image197361964130118115311.0211Original Lena Image244061709324400171350.0033Table 11RS analysis of the AES embedded stego-image used in [Fig. 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"}.Images$R_{M}$$S_{M}$$R_{- M}$$S_{- M}$% of Embedded textSierpinsky196221971530027114711.02092TUX197591962830058115640.94915Farhan198031927829841115860.83961Hilbert196051926329926113400.83068Goldhill198361954529954114970.90042Lena196971941329921114070.86548Barbara198281939929838115500.85112Man & Woman201001936029699118170.84645Table 12Comparison with existing work in terms of PSNR, SSIM and ESR for reconstructed reference image.Metric[@b29][@b27]Proposed/HaarProposed/LGT 5/3PSNR27.708032.3733$\infty$$\infty$SSIM0.70280.834111ESR0.18700.127500Table 13PSNR,SSIM,ESR between VMCI and the Reference Image.Metric[@b29][@b27]Proposed/HaarProposed/LGT 5/3PSNR26.244727.603927.964030.9728SSIM0.61050.70140.80700.8554ESR0.26820.16010.12750.1727

5.4. Applications of the proposed scheme for integrity of digital data {#sec5.4}
----------------------------------------------------------------------

We explain the potential applications of our VMCI generating algorithm in the context of Online Social Interaction Network (OSIN). Due to a sudden boom in the IT sector and digital globalization, there is a huge flow of cross-border information exchange. The results of this digitization can be seen in the form of outbursts of OSIN's like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Whatsapp, Amazon. With no such Data Protection Laws (DPL), even in the most developed countries, there is a severe need to safeguards our digital content while interacting on these OSIN's. The network of transmission over the internet is far more complicated than just a sender--receiver model. The longer the networks, more are the chances that the data being transmitted gets corrupted by noise in the channel, or by an intruder. The data on these social networking sites ranges from texts to images relating to personal information, events, etc. Imagine transmitting a digital image on the OSIN to a friend which is intercepted by a saboteur. Cryptography is an option, but since it converts the image into noise, it calls for suspicion on the transmitted text, which may eventually result in integrity loss and corrupt file transmission. The proposed scheme incorporates an encryption algorithm and also generates a visually meaningful cipher that can be uploaded on a cloud database.

An important application of the proposed VMCI would be in the areas of medical imaging. Critical information about a COVID-19 patient's nasopharyngeal test images can be transmitted by embedding the converted VMCI in the Electro Cardiogram Signals (ECG) [@b46] so that only designated health care officials can access it.

The other relationship, though it is not directly related, is with the concept of network steganography and Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [@b47] which relies on manipulating the internet protocol (IP) which is imperative in any communication. Among the few network steganographic methods, Protocol Steganography, which manipulates the packet header files, is an area where our proposed scheme can be utilized. Since exclusively adhering to these Protocol steganographic methods involve the risk of detection, potential loss of information, our proposed method can work in tandem to embed the stego-image in the unused, partial, or optional fields and transmit the data without violating any constraints of the excess size of the data transmitted and without an actual sender-receiver synchronization.

6. Conclusion {#sec6}
=============

This algorithm generated a visually meaningful cipher image in the wavelet domain and facilitated reversible data hiding. Experimental results validate our claim that the use of mathematical pairing function produces a VMCI of the same size as that of the original image without incurring any excess storage, transmission, and computational costs. This fact was missing in the related existing algorithms. Further, the generation of partial cipher using an alternative chaos-based GBDA scheme was found quite comparable to the traditional algorithm like AES-ECB. Obtaining a perfect reconstruction of the reference images by utilizing Integer Wavelet Transform is another crucial feature of the algorithm. The robustness of the algorithm allows it to generate VMCI of tunable quality using different wavelet transforms and a proper digitizing factor. Further, experimental results and their different analysis validate the applicability of the proposed scheme in multimedia encryption and make it a suitable encryption algorithm for modern days. An area of definite improvement that we see in our scheme, can be in terms of increasing the PSNR and SSIM score further by identifying optimum locations in the cover image for embedding the secret. In future, one can explore ideas about more parallel modes of operations to create 2D partial cipher, which are required for VMCI.
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 {#appendix}

We give a theoretical justification of the invertibility of the function defined in Section [3.2](#sec3.2){ref-type="sec"}.

Case 1:When $n_{1} \neq max\left( n_{1},n_{2} \right)$. Let $z = \sigma\left( n_{1},n_{2} \right) = n_{1} + n_{2}^{2}$. Define $t = n_{2}^{2}$ so that $z = t + n_{1}$. Since $$\left. t = n_{2}^{2}\Longrightarrow n_{2} = \pm \sqrt{\left( t \right)},\quad\text{but~since}\quad n_{2} > 0\Longrightarrow n_{2} = \sqrt{\left( t \right)} \right.$$ $$\left. \text{Thus,}\quad n_{2} = h\left( t \right) = \sqrt{t},\quad\text{now~since}\quad h^{\prime}\left( t \right) = \frac{1}{2\sqrt{t}} > 0,\quad\forall t > 0,\quad\quad\text{hence~one–one~and~clearly~onto}\Longrightarrow h\quad\text{~is~invertible~with}\quad\quad h^{- 1}\left( n_{2} \right) = t^{2} \right.$$ $$\left. \text{Now},\quad t \leq t + n_{1} < t + 2n_{2} + 1\Longrightarrow n_{2}^{2} \leq z < \left( n_{2} + 1 \right)^{2} \right.$$ $$\text{Thus,}\quad h^{- 1}\left( n_{2} \right) \leq z < h^{-}\left( n_{2} + 1 \right)$$ $$n_{2} \leq h\left( z \right) < n_{2} + 1$$ $$n_{2} \leq \sqrt{z} < n_{2} + 1$$Now, since $n_{2}$ and $n_{2} + 1$ are two consecutive numbers, thus we obtain that $$n_{2} = \left\lfloor \left( \sqrt{z} \right) \right\rfloor$$$$n_{1} = z - \left( n_{2} \right)^{2}$$Case 2:When $n_{1} = max\left( n_{1},n_{2} \right)$. Let $z = n_{1}^{2} + n_{1} + n_{2}$, define $t = n_{1}^{2} + n_{1}$ so that $z = t + n_{2}$. Since $$\left. t = n_{1}^{2} + n_{1}\Longrightarrow n_{1} = \frac{- 1 \pm \sqrt{\left( 1 + 4t \right)}}{2},\quad\text{but~since}\quad n_{1} \geq 0\Longrightarrow n_{1} = \frac{- 1 + \sqrt{\left( 1 + 4t \right)}}{2} \right.$$ $$\text{Thus,}\quad n_{1} = h\left( t \right) = \frac{- 1 + \sqrt{\left( 1 + 4t \right)}}{2},\quad\text{proceeding~as~above~we~see~that~}h\quad\text{~is~invertible}$$ $$\left. \text{Now},\quad t \leq t + n_{2} < t + 2n_{1} + 1\Longrightarrow n_{1}^{2} + n_{1} \leq z < \left( n_{1} + 1 \right)^{2} + \left( n_{1} + 1 \right) \right.$$ $$\text{Thus,}\quad h^{- 1}\left( n_{1} \right) \leq z < h^{- 1}\left( n_{1} + 1 \right)$$ $$n_{1} \leq h\left( z \right) < n_{1} + 1$$ $$n_{1} \leq \frac{- 1 + \sqrt{\left( 1 + 4z \right)}}{2} < n_{1} + 1$$ $$n_{1} = \left\lfloor \frac{- 1 + \sqrt{\left( 1 + 4z \right)}}{2} \right\rfloor$$$$n_{2} = z - n_{1}^{2} - n_{1}$$
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